






Centre for Global Higher Education working paper series 
 
Analysing neoliberalism in 
theory and practice: The 
case of performance-based 
funding for higher education  
 
Kevin J. Dougherty and Rebecca S. Natow  
 
 










	 	 	 	 	




















Published by the Centre for Global Higher Education,  








The Centre for Global Higher Education (CGHE) is a research partnership of 
international universities, funded by the Economic and Social Research 
Council, the Office for Students and Research England. 
 
CGHE’s research is focused on higher education and its future development and 
aims to inform and improve higher education policy and practice. CGHE’s three 
research programmes integrate local, national and global perspectives, and its 
researchers are based in nine countries across five continents: Europe, Asia, 
Africa, Australia and North America.  
 
 
	 	 	 	 	
   
Analysing neoliberalism in theory and practice: 
The case of performance-based funding for  
higher education* 
 







The origins of performance-based funding .......................................... 6	
Implementation of performance-based funding ................................. 14	
Impacts of performance-based funding ............................................. 19	
Conclusions ....................................................................................... 25	
References ......................................................................................... 32	
                                                
*	We wish to thank Steven Brint, Floyd Hammack, Thomas Rabovsky, Barbara Sporn, and two 
anonymous reviewers for the Centre on Global Higher Education for their very helpful comments on 













Analysing neoliberalism in theory and practice: 
The case of performance-based funding for  
higher education 
 
Kevin J. Dougherty and Rebecca S. Natow 
 
 
Kevin J. Dougherty: Professor of Higher Education and Education Policy at 
Teachers College, Columbia University 
doughertykevin@tc.columbia.edu 
Rebecca S. Natow: Assistant Professor of Educational Leadership and Policy at 




Neoliberal ideas – whether the new public management (NPM), principal-agent 
theory (or agency theory), or performance management – have provided the 
rationale for sweeping reforms in the governance and operation of higher education.  
Despite this, little attention has been devoted to how well neoliberal theory 
illuminates the policy process by which neoliberal policy is enacted and 
implemented. This paper expands our understanding of the origins, implementation, 
and impacts of neoliberal policies by examining the case of performance-based 
funding for higher education in the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, and 
elsewhere. With regard to policy origins, neoliberal theory correctly anticipates the 
key role that top government officials play in the development of performance 













and of higher education institutions in the formation of neoliberal policies. Neoliberal 
theory correctly notes the important role of monetary incentives as policy instruments 
and the obstacles posed by gaming on the part of agents. At the same time, this 
paper demonstrates that the implementation of performance funding also involves 
the use of other policy instruments as well. Moreover, the performance funding 
experience points to a host of obstacles beyond gaming to the effectiveness of 
performance funding. Finally, with regard to outcomes of neoliberal policymaking, the 
paper demonstrates that outcomes fitting the neoliberal focus on organisational 
effectiveness and efficiency are only weakly produced by performance funding, but 
performance funding is associated with a host of unintended impacts that neoliberal 
theory ignores. The paper concludes with recommendations for how to improve 
performance funding and how to construct policy models that that go beyond the 
narrow imaginings of neoliberal theory.   
 
Introduction 
Neoliberalism has been a longstanding concern of higher education policymakers 
and scholars, with many championing it and just as many decrying it (see for 
example, Brown, 2013; Giroux 2002; Jones, 2012a; Kivisto, 2007; Marginson, 2009). 
In good part, this concern has been due to the fact that neoliberal theory is not just a 
description of a situation but also a prescription for action. Hence, it has provided the 
rationale for sweeping reforms in the governance and operation of higher education 
(Brown, 2011, 2013; Marginson, 2009; Olssen & Peters, 2005; Rhoades & Sporn, 
2002; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).  
As we are using it here, “neoliberalism” refers to a variety of theories of public 
administration that – while they vary in specifics – have certain common claims as 
they relate to education. These theories include the new public management (NPM), 
new managerialism, principal-agent theory (or agency theory), and less directly, 
performance management (Bleiklie, 1998; Broucker & DeWit, 2015; Deem & 
Brehony, 2005; Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresini, 2008; Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018; 
Gerrish, 2015; Hood, 1991; Kivisto, 2007; Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Marginson, 2009; 
Moynihan, 2008; Olssen & Peters, 2005; and Pollitt & Dan, 2011).1 They share 
certain key intellectual precursors, particularly the economics of organisations, in the 













Neave, 1998; Olssen & Peters, 2005). Neoliberalism is particularly focused on 
making public agencies more effective and economically efficient.2 There is less 
concern about using them as instruments of greater equality or social solidarity 
(Ferlie et al., 2008, p. 335; Hood, 1991, pp. 11-12, 15; Marginson, 1997, p. 5; Olssen 
& Peters, 20015, pp. 320-322; Pollitt & Dan, 2011, p. 5). With regard to higher 
education in particular, NPM downplays the importance of academic freedom and 
collegial, shared governance between faculty and administrators in favour of vesting 
more authority in institutional administration and marketing the institution as 
attractive to key stakeholders (Bleiklie, 2018).   
A key neoliberal tenet is that human well-being is best ensured by encouraging 
private enterprise, individual responsibility, and competitive markets to spur and 
coordinate the actions of entrepreneurs (Harvey, 2005, pp. 2, 64-65; Olssen and 
Peters, 2005, pp. 314, 317, 322-324). Government operations should be privatised 
as much as possible by selling off public holdings and services to private 
entrepreneurs (Broucker & DeWit, 2015, pp. 61-62; Brown, 2018, p. 4; Feigenbaum, 
Henig, & Hamnett, 1998; Harvey, 2005, pp. 2, 64; Hood, 1991, p. 3; Olssen and 
Peters, 2005, pp. 314, 322-324). But when this is not possible, governments should 
enmesh public agencies in “quasi-markets” by creating fiscal incentives for those 
agencies to compete with each other to become more efficient (Dill, 2007, p. 52; 
Hood (1991), p. 3; Le Grand, 2007; Marginson, 2009, pp. 2-4; Olssen and Peters, 
2005, pp. 318-324; Naidoo, Shankar, & Veer, 2011, p. 1145; Pollitt & Dan, 2011, p. 
5).3 Because neoliberal theory conceptualises government agencies as 
fundamentally self-interested, with their interests often running counter to those of 
the elected official “principals” they serve, it argues that monetary incentives and 
accountability and monitoring are needed to get the interests of agencies aligned 
with those of principals and to address the “information asymmetry” in which agents 
usually know more about their activities than do the principals (Broucker & DeWit, 
2015, pp. 61-62; Connell, Fawcett, and Meagher, 2009, p. 334; Ferlie et al., 2008, 
pp. 335-336; Kivisto, 2007, pp. 106-110; Lane & Kivisto, 2008, pp. 144-146, 160-
161; Olssen & Peters, 2005, pp. 315, 327-329; Pollitt & Dan, 2011, p. 5; Renmans, 
Paul, & Dujardin, 2016, pp. 13-15). Indeed, Connell et al. (2000, p. 334) note that for 
NPM and neoliberal theory of public-sector organisations more generally: “each part 
of an organization functions like a profit-making firm, with its managers held 













individuals are required to make themselves accountable in terms of competition” 
(emphasis in original).     
These ideas have profoundly shaped higher education policymaking worldwide 
(Brown, 2011, 2013, 2018; Dougherty & Natow, 2015; Kelchen, 2018b; Frolich, 
Kalpazidou-Schmidt, & Rosa, 2010; Guthrie & Neumann, 2007; Huisman & Currie, 
2004; Jones, 2004; Marginson, 1997; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004; Rhoades & 
Sporn, 2002). Yet, it is notable how little attention has been devoted to how well 
neoliberal theory illuminates the policy process by which neoliberal policy is enacted.  
Are the actors and motives that neoliberal theory points to actually the ones that are 
involved in enacting and implementing neoliberal policy? What policy instruments 
does the theory identify as driving neoliberal policies, and are they indeed the ones 
used to implement those policies? What implementation obstacles does neoliberal 
theory identify and how well does that list capture the hindrances to neoliberal policy 
that do appear? Finally, what likely impacts – unintended as well as intended – of 
neoliberal policies does neoliberal theory predict and to what extent are these 
forecasts met?    
This paper expands our understanding of the origins, implementation, and impacts of 
neoliberal policies by examining the case of performance-based funding for higher 
education in the United States, Europe, Canada, Australia, and elsewhere. We argue 
that performance-based funding is an apt case. Such funding has been repeatedly 
identified as a major example of neoliberal policymaking (Broucker & DeWit, 2015; 
Ferlie, Musselin, & Andresani, 2008; Gerrish 2015; Hillman, Fryar, & Crispin-Trujillo, 
2018; Kelchen, 2018b; Lane & Kivisto, 2008; and Schulze-Cleven & Olson, 2017).  
Moreover, performance-based funding for higher education is quite widespread. In 
the United States, the National Conference of State Legislatures estimated that as of 
2015 some 33 U.S. states had performance-based funding programmes in place that 
reward higher education institutions for such outcomes as student retention, 
completion of certain courses or programmes, degree completion, and job placement 
(National Conference of State Legislatures, 2015; see also Dougherty & Natow, 
2015, pp. 30-35).4 Performance-based funding is also quite common outside the 
United States. For example, many European countries (19 as of 2010), Canada, and 
Australia have funded their higher education system on the basis of output-related 













(Center for Higher Education Policy Studies, 2010; DeBoer, Jongbloed, Benneworth, 
Cremonini, Kolster, Kottmann, Lemmens-Krug, & Vossensteyn, 2015; Dougherty & 
Natow, 2015, pp. 20-21; Gauthier, 2004).5 Finally, the case of performance funding 
illuminates a previously understated aspect of neoliberal theory: that neoliberal 
policies can lead to unintended consequences that can move higher education 
organisations away from egalitarian ideals.  
In the remainder of the paper, we will examine the origins, implementation, and 
impacts of performance-based funding for higher education both in the United States 
and abroad. A key feature of our analysis will be to bring out which elements of the 
development of performance funding are correctly captured by neoliberal theory and 
which elements are missed by it. Moreover, as we go along, we will note when our 
findings are echoed by studies of the origins, implementation, and impacts of 
neoliberal reforms other than performance-based funding for higher education. Our 
critique of neoliberalism draws on original research we conducted on the origins, 
implementation, and impacts of performance funding in the United States 
(Dougherty, Jones, Lahr, Natow, Pheatt, & Reddy, 2016; Dougherty & Natow, 2015) 
and on our review of the research literature on performance funding, performance 
management, and policy implementation in the United States and many other 
countries.   
We should note that our approach focuses on the predictive capacity of neoliberal 
theory in explaining neoliberal reform. This might lead us to underplay the normative 
dimension of neo-liberalism, that is the aspect of neoliberal theory where the 
introduction of quasi-market mechanisms into government operations is seen not 
simply as a matter of securing greater efficiency but also of securing 
ideological/cultural conformity to capitalist principles on the part of government. 
However, the virtue of our approach is that it allows us to capture several features of 
neoliberalism that are missed by the more sweeping critiques of it. Nonetheless, we 
















The origins of performance-based funding 
The question of why governments enacted performance-based funding leads 
naturally to asking what actors, motives, and political conditions were involved. What 
role does neoliberal theory play both as an incitement to action (its prescriptive side) 
and as an explanation of what did occur (its analytic side)? 
Certainly there is evidence that neoliberal ideas played a major role in the push for 
performance-based funding in the United States and elsewhere. Scholars have 
pointed out how the genesis of performance funding in the United States was driven 
in good part by views of public administration consonant with neoliberal ideas, even 
if public officials often were not aware of the connection (Dougherty & Natow, 2015, 
pp. 64-68, 150; Hillman et al., 2018; Kelchen, 2018b). For example, a state official in 
Washington State described sentiments among legislators that fit well with the claims 
of neoliberal theory:6   
They were believers in accountability in general. Not solely in higher 
education but across the spectrum of governmental activities and 
funding. They were proponents of smaller government and fiscal 
restraint. And I think they were also believers in the notion that we tend 
to get more of what the funding structure responds to, so what is 
incentivized and measured and funded, we tend to get more of and less 
of other things. . . And there was a lot of talk, in the early nineties and 
going forward, about reinventing and reengineering government and 
focusing on outcomes and data related to that as opposed to inputs. 
(Quoted in Dougherty & Natow, 2015, p. 64) 
Scholars have also found that the genesis of performance-based funding in 
Australia, Canada, Denmark, England, Germany, and Norway is consonant with 
neoliberal theory (Barnetson & Boberg, 2000, pp. 75-79; Brown, 2018; Frolich, 
Kalpazidou-Schmidt, & Rosa, 2010, p. 18; Guthrie & Neumann, 2007, p. 234; 
Huisman & Currie, 2004, p. 534; Jones, 2004, pp. 44-46, 49; Marginson, 1997, p. 8; 














With respect to Germany, Gary Rhoades and Barbara Sporn find:  
[U]nder the title “Zielvereinbarungen” (goal contracts) and 
“Finanzautonomie” (financial autonomy), contracted and performance-
based budgeting together with institutional autonomy have been 
implemented at increasing numbers of German universities. The aim has 
been to increase quality (measured as efficiency and effectiveness), 
accountability, and self-regulation through effective leadership… What 
models have been used in this reform process? Basically, we find the 
principles of “New Public Management (NPM)” … it involves 
strengthening market-orientation and competition, management 
concepts from private industry, decentralised structures with increased 
freedom for individuals and units, and output control and assessment. 
(Rhoades & Sporn, 2002, p. 374). 
Who supported performance-based funding and why? 
If neoliberal theory motivated the development of performance-based funding, who 
precisely were the supporters and were their motives consonant with neoliberal 
theory? The literature on neoliberalism – whether celebratory or critical – has not 
delved deeply into how precisely neoliberal policies are enacted, examining in detail 
the supporters and opponents and their reasons (see the critiques by Mars & Rios-
Aguilar, 2010; Schulze-Cleven, Reitz, Maesse, & Angermuller, 2017; Schulze-Cleven 
& Olson, 2017). This lack of detail is consequential. The lack of close attention to the 
political origins of neoliberal policies can lead to a narrative that it is simply a case of 
political “principals” imposing it on largely recalcitrant “agents.” But this leaves 
unexamined the motives of the agents, who may actually see benefit in neoliberal 
policies and, in any cases, are potent political actors pursuing interests of their own. 
As Matthew Mars and Cecilia Rios-Aguilar (2010, pp. 455-456) note: 
The higher education scholarship has viewed the entrepreneurial behaviors 
and activities of those within the academy as outcomes or consequences of 
neo-liberal policies, globalization, and associated market permeation that 
have promoted the emergence of market and market-like agendas. Thus, 
the demand-side perspective has dominated the academic entrepreneurship 
literature and has perpetuated what we have observed to be the 













entrepreneurial by the conditions that comprise and surround their academic 
environments. The increased application of theoretical approaches … that 
acknowledge the entrepreneurial agency of individuals would create 
opportunities for higher education scholars to more objectively and 
thoroughly explore the independent agendas of entrepreneurial-minded 
professors, students, practitioners, and administrators.   
As Mars and Rios-Aguilar (2010) note, it is important to focus not just on the 
intentions and power of “principals” who are pushing a policy but also the intentions 
and power of “agents” who are to be its implementers. Agents can play very 
important roles in the formation and implementation of neoliberal policies. They may 
even be supporters of neoliberal reform, although often for reasons different from 
those cited by neoliberal theory (see Slaughter & Rhoades, 2004).   
It is also important to acknowledge context. There is considerable variation in the 
enactment and implementation of neoliberal policies across nations and their 
subnational political divisions. This shows up in considerable variation in the actors 
and motives that shape neoliberal policies and the eventual form, content, and mode 
of implementation (Broucker & DeWit, 2015; Rhoades & Sporn, 2002; Schulze-
Cleven & Olson, 2017; Schulze-Cleven et al., 2017).    
In the next three sections, we examine how well the origins of performance funding 
fit the neoliberal emphasis on the interests and actions of principals. The first section 
identifies evidence comporting with neoliberal theory, while the second section notes 
evidence that is at variance with it. Meanwhile, the third section analyses the 
importance of national and subnational contexts, which are given too little attention 
by neoliberal theory.  
Evidence in keeping with the neoliberal conceptualisation of the policy actors 
Neoliberal theory emphasises that top government officials will be the key agents of 
neoliberal reforms. They are the ones motivated by a concern to cut back 
government funding and secure greater efficiency from public agencies, including 
public higher education institutions. To do this, top government officials will wish  
to create a quasi-market for those institutions that uses market incentives to  
prod them to compete with each other to attract clients and public support  













The development of performance-based funding provides evidence for this 
expectation on the part of neoliberal theory. In the United States, state governors, 
legislators, and officials of state higher education boards certainly played a key role 
in the development of US performance-based funding (Dougherty & Natow, 2015, 
pp. 64-70, 146-149; Gorbunov, 2013; and McLendon, Hearn, & Deaton, 2006). For 
example, in Tennessee, a legislative staffer noted: 
The real drive toward outcome basis of allocating resources was 
internally generated and it came from the governor personally... … It 
came from the legislative members of this working group [set up by the 
governor] in a significant way…. [T]his outcome-driven allocation of 
resources was something that we on the governor’s staff and the 
legislative members of this ad hoc working group strongly embraced. 
And the folks in the working group who were more of higher education 
and from higher education also believed that it was the right thing to do. 
(Quoted in Dougherty & Natow, 2015, p. 146)  
Moreover, studies of the origins of performance funding outside the US also point to 
the key role of government officials in spearheading those efforts in Europe, Canada, 
and Australia (DeBoer et al., 2015; Guthrie & Neumann, 2007; Jones, 2004; and 
Woelert & Yates, 2015).7 For example, in Ontario, Canada: 
In 1995, the higher education policy environment in Ontario began to 
change. The election of a new Progressive Conservative government 
under Premier Mike Harris signalled the beginning of the “Common 
Sense Revolution,” a platform of policy change designed to address the 
provinceʼs deficit by reducing government expenditures while 
simultaneously reducing government revenues through cuts to provincial 
taxes…. Privatization and marketization were key elements of many of 
the new policy initiatives associated with the Harris government, 
signalling a change in direction in higher education policy. Key 
Performance Indicators were introduced in both the university and college 
sectors, and KPIs now determine a modest component of each 














Evidence deviating from the neoliberal conceptualisation of the policy actors  
Studies of the origins of performance funding also show that neoliberal theory  
fails to anticipate several key actors and motives behind the development of  
performance funding. In particular, neoliberal theory fails to address the role  
of business as a principal and the entrepreneurial role of agents, including  
higher education institutions.  
The role of business 
Despite its emphasis on the application of business methods to government 
agencies, neoliberal theory says surprisingly little about the role of business in the 
enactment of neoliberal policies. Yet the origins of performance-based funding in the 
United States give ample testimony to the major role of business in the enactment of 
state-level performance funding (Dougherty & Natow, 2015, pp. 67-68, 146-148; 
Opoczynski, 2016, pp. 10-11). This business role has taken both direct and indirect 
forms. In some states, business leaders directly lobbied for performance funding, 
working with state government officials to secure and even design the performance 
funding system. For example, in Indiana, the State Chamber of Commerce declared: 
“The Indiana Chamber supports a shift in Indiana’s higher education funding formula 
from an enrollment-based system to a performance-based system” (quoted in 
Indiana Commission for Higher Education, 2009, p. 3). Chamber leaders testified 
publicly in favour of performance funding and sent messages to Chamber members 
supporting it (Dougherty & Natow, 2015, p. 147).   
But business also worked indirectly, by shaping the climate of ideas in which 
policymakers operated and by affecting the incentives government officials faced.8  
Pushing neoliberal ideas about improving government efficiency by making 
government agencies use business-like methods and be subjected to market-like 
constraints,9 business made it more likely that state officials would view performance 
funding as a desirable and politically attractive policy for higher education. This 
ideological influence allowed business to exert considerable power over the genesis 
of performance funding, even when it was not directly involved. This ideological 
influence was evident in South Carolina, Washington, Florida, and Missouri 
(Dougherty & Natow, 2015, p. 67).   
Business also exercised power by its influence over the incentives faced by 













economy, state officials are attracted to policies that would be helpful to business 
even when business people do not lobby for such policies. State officials recognise 
that “business confidence” – often bought through pro-business policies – is often 
key to getting business to invest in a state and generate jobs and tax revenues 
(Block, 1987; Carruthers, 1994; Dougherty, 1994; Lindblom, 1977; Skocpol & 
Amenta, 1986).10 In Missouri, for example, a prominent state legislator observed how 
business indirectly shaped the genesis of performance funding:  
You’ve got this maybe coincidental group of conservative business 
entities who act as a resistance to additional funding… they want to  
talk about things like accountability… So you know, performance-based 
funding was just kind of brought to us by consultants as a way to  
pacify various conservative groups. (Quoted in Dougherty & Natow, 
2015, p. 67) 
Studies of the origins of performance funding outside the United States do not 
mention of the role of business in the development of performance-based funding in 
other countries. However, such a role might be there, given the importance put on 
closer connections to business and labour market in the performance funding 
programmes in Australia, Austria, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, and Scotland, and 
the rise of European business organisations such as European Round Table of 
Industrialists that promote a narrative of the societal need for human capital 
development and improved industrial competitiveness (DeBoer et al., 2015, pp. 36, 
43, 57-59, 84, 102, 118, 121-122; Guthrie & Neumann, 2007, p. 236; Slaughter & 
Cantwell, 2012, pp. 588-591).   
 
The role of higher education institutions 
Another proponent of neoliberal policy also goes unmentioned in neoliberal theory, 
namely the agents who will be implementing government policies. They are seen by 
neoliberal theory as objects – and resistant objects at that – to neoliberal policies. 
The agents are conceived as usually having interests that conflict with those of their 
principals who initiate the policies, either wanting to do different things than the 
principals want or at the very least wanting to put in less effort (“shirking”) than 
principals might desire (Broucker & DeWit, 2015, p. 70; Kivisto, 2007, pp. 16, 22-23, 













145, 154, 160-161, 164-165, 171-172; Olssen & Peters, 2005, pp. 324-325).   
However, research on the origins of performance-based funding finds that higher 
education institutions – which act as agents of their principals in the higher reaches 
of government – are often key supporters of neoliberal reform and their motives often 
converge with those of their principals.11 In the United States, higher education 
institutions – while opposing performance funding in several states – also supported 
it in several other states (Dougherty & Natow, 2015, pp. 70-76, 151-157; see also 
Macias, 2012, pp. 139-140 and Rabovsky, 2014a, pp. 765-766). And studies of 
performance-based funding in Europe find evidence of substantial university support, 
even as they also find evidence of misgivings or opposition (DeBoer et al., 2015, p. 
62; Frolich et al., 2010, pp. 12-13; but see Braun, 1993, pp. 144, 147, 149).   
This support for performance-based funding on the part of higher education 
institutions stems from two main motives. First, higher education personnel and 
institutions sometimes support performance-based funding because they believe it 
will produce improvements in higher education outcomes, such as student 
graduation or faculty research productivity, that state officials value.12 This motive 
certainly was present in the United States (Dougherty & Natow, 2015, p. 71; Li, 
2017b, p. 195; Ness, Deupree, & Gandara, 2015, pp. 52-53; Rabovsky, 2014a, p. 
771). For example, a state community college leader in Florida declared: “I think the 
philosophy of performance funding is just a basic concept that should be embraced 
by everybody. I honestly believe that whether they get more money or not, that they 
should be out there trying to get the best performance that they possibly can” 
(quoted in Dougherty & Natow, 2015, p. 71). Moreover, there is evidence that this 
desire by higher education officials to improve educational outcomes was at work in 
other countries as well, whether the Netherlands or Norway (DeBoer et al. 2015, p. 
31; Frolich, 2011, pp. 847-850, 854). Drawing on surveys of Norwegian higher 
education leaders, Frolich concludes:  
The HEI leaders support PBF – if not uncritically – mainly due to the 
belief that PBF increases downward, inward and outward accountability. 
The HEIs are expected to adapt their strategies to the system of rewards 
for credits, which is seen as enhancing both student recruitment and 
efforts to ‘take better care’ of the students. The leaders believe that 













as research activities become more focused on results and that 
institutions will likely place priority on the research and funding 
possibilities which will augment their budgets. (Frolich, 100, p. 847) 
Secondly, higher education personnel and institutions frequently believe that 
performance-based funding – whatever the demands and the dangers it poses for 
the institutions – also provides them with a new way to legitimate themselves in the 
eyes of government officials, other stakeholders, and the public and therefore assure 
their access to public funding.13 When government funding is tight, they can make a 
case for more funding or at least protect existing funding by appealing to favourable 
performance indicators (Dougherty & Natow, 2015, pp. 67, 71-72, 152; Rabovsky, 
2014a, p. 766; see also Rabovsky, 2014b, p. 267; Rutherford & Rabovsky, 2017, pp. 
8-9). For example, a community college leader in Florida explained why they 
supported performance funding: 
We thought it would lead to an improved funding. We thought it was a 
great opportunity to market the system in terms of what we do as a 
community college system in terms of outcomes…. We thought it would 
be a great opportunity … to explain to legislators and policymakers what 
the role of the community college was all about in the state of Florida.  
(Quoted in Dougherty et al., 2011, p. 37) 
This motive appears as well in studies of performance-based funding and quality 
assurance in Norway (Frolich, 2011, p. 847; Frolich et al., 2010, p. 16).  
 
The importance of national and subnational context 
Neoliberal theory has not been unmindful of the impact of socio-political context in 
shaping how neoliberal policies are enacted (Kiser, 1998). However, it has not given 
sufficient importance to this point. Which actors are involved, with what valence, and 
with what effect can vary greatly across different settings (Jones, Jones, Elliott, 
Owens, Assalone, & Gandara, 2017, pp. 5-6; Pollitt & Dan, 2011, p. 52; and 
Schulze-Cleven et al. 2017, pp. 803, 808, 809). 
In the case of US performance funding, how actively governors, legislators, and 
business supported performance funding varied considerably across states 













legislators, they were significantly more likely to be involved and supportive to the 
degree that the Republican membership of a legislature was high (Dougherty & 
Natow, 2015, pp. 64-66; Li, 2017a, p. 763; McLendon et al. 2006, p. 11).   
Furthermore, state context affects whether and how performance-based funding 
programmes address racial inequality. An analysis of how states address race in 
their performance-based funding programmes finds that, while 20 of the 32 
programmes extant did address race disparities, six of those states made the race 
metrics optional rather than mandated. The states that made racial metrics tended  
to be in the South (Arkansas, Florida, Virginia). The other states with optional  
racial-disparity metrics were Illinois, Kansas, and Massachusetts (Jones et al.,  
2017, pp. 130-137).14   
 
Implementation of performance-based funding 
As in the case of explaining the origins of policies, neoliberal accounts provide an 
incomplete analysis of how those policies are implemented. With regard to policy 
instruments,15 they focus on financial incentives. And when considering the 
obstacles that those policy instruments encounter, they focus on gaming and 
resistance. Analysis of the implementation of performance-based funding in the 
United States and elsewhere backs up both predictions but it also finds other policy 
instruments and implementation obstacles at work as well.   
Policy Instruments 
Neoliberal theory focuses on the use of monetary incentives and accountability and 
monitoring as the main motivators to get agents to move in the directions desired by 
principals. Because agents are conceptualised as self-interested, with their interests 
often running counter to those of the principals, incentives and monitoring are 
necessary to align agents’ motives with those of the principals (Broucker & DeWit, 
2015, pp. 61-62; Ferlie et al., 2008, pp. 335-336; Kivisto, 2007, pp. 106-110; Lane & 
Kivisto, 2008, pp. 144-146, 160-161; Olssen & Peters, 2005, pp. 315, 327-329; Pollitt 
& Dan, 2011, p. 5).     
The implementation of performance funding in the United States certainly gives 













al., 2016b, pp. 42-52). For example, a state policymaker in Indiana stated: “The state 
wants higher graduation rates, the state wants more research dollars coming in, the 
state wants a more efficient higher ed system, and so they would say, ‘If you do 
these things that align with our policies, then we will try and get you some more 
money for doing that.’ It’s a simple financial incentive model” (quoted in Dougherty et 
al., 2016b, p. 43).   
But the implementation of performance funding in the United States also testifies to 
the importance put on other policy instruments, including persuasive communication 
and capacity building, that are given much less emphasis by neoliberal theory 
(Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 52-76; Jones et al., 2017, pp. 147-149; and Li, 2017b, 
191-192). Persuasive communication involves the principal communicating to the 
agent why a certain policy is important, with the hope of aligning their values 
(Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 52-54). For example, a state higher education official in 
Indiana stated: “We really worked hard to [implement performance funding] in 
partnership with the institutions. When [the previous commissioner of higher 
education] was here, he worked with all of the presidents and all the institutions to try 
to get them to buy into this. We’ve continued to acknowledge their concerns as we 
refine the metrics” (quoted in Dougherty et al., 2016b, p. 53). This strategy of 
persuasive communication fits with the strain in principal-agent theory that 
emphasises how deviant action by agents is more a matter of “slippage” due to 
conflicting and inadequate communication and less a matter of self-interested 
“shirking,” which is the formulation favoured by the dominant, economics-oriented 
version of principal-agent theory (Lane & Kivisto, 2008, pp. 154, 164-165, 170-172).   
Capacity building involves expanding the resources that institutions have available to 
produce the desired outcomes. These resources could be money, skilled staff, 
knowledge, etc. American states pursuing performance funding have moved to 
enhance the organisational capacities of higher education institutions by such means 
as holding workshops where institutions can inform each other about organisational 
obstacles they have encountered in responding to the demands of performance 
funding and promising solutions they are pursuing to meet those demands 
















Neoliberal theory has devoted considerable attention to why implementation breaks 
down. As before, research on obstacles to the implementation of performance 
funding for higher education both buttresses the claims of neoliberal theory but also 
points to much that it misses.  
Evidence in keeping with the neoliberal conceptualisation of policy 
implementation 
In keeping with its analysis of policy origins, neoliberal theory’s analysis of policy 
implementation focuses on conflicting self-interests between principals and agents. 
Those conflicting self-interests make it likely that agents will be tempted to go their 
own way to the detriment of the principal’s interests, and this probability is 
heightened if there is significant “information asymmetry” in which agents are far 
more aware than principals about how well they are carrying out the principal’s 
desires (Kivisto, 2007, pp. 17-18, 56-66; Lane, 2012, pp. 282-284; Lane & Kivisto, 
2008, pp. 143, 145, 146, 158-159). Principals will try to combat this threatened 
divergence by providing agents with monetary incentives to behave and by 
monitoring their actions (see above). But agents can defeat that monitoring by 
“gaming” it in ways that obscures their deviance. For example, academics can 
respond to principals’ demands for improved graduation rates by lowering their 
grading standards and demands for improved research productivity by choosing 
easier research projects and slicing up their publications into many different forms 
(Kivisto, 2007, pp. 98-100, 112).    
Research on the implementation of performance funding does find considerable 
evidence of extensive resistance and gaming on the part of higher education 
institutions.17 US higher education institutions and their staffers frequently do resist 
the demands of state governments that they wholeheartedly pursue certain 
outcomes standards (Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 159-161; Li, 2017, p. 193). They 
attempt to disguise this resistance by such devices as reducing course and 
programme demands so that students can more easily pass (Dougherty et al., 
2016b, pp. 184-189). For example, a faculty member at an Ohio University stated:18 
Well, in an effort to promote student success, there is a substantial 
pressure to minimise the failure rates of the students in some of these 













of grades in order to make sure that the students are passing all of these 
courses and so forth. So I as a faculty member have a concern as to the 
watering down of our course materials as well as the quality of our 
majors, the programs. (Quoted in Dougherty et al., 2016b, p. 186) 
Meanwhile, studies of performance funding in England and Australia have found 
gaming as well in the operation of their performance-based systems for funding 
research (Talib & Steele, 2000; Woelert & Yates, 2015, pp. 184-186; but see Sharp, 
2004 contra). For example, Peter Woelert and Lyn Yates conclude from their 
interview study of Australia’s performance funding of research: 
The phenomenon of ‘output distortion’ brings us to the discussion of a 
more deep-seated problem with the current form of performance 
measurement en vogue in Australian higher education… there is also a 
wide range of evidence, both historical and recent, that the same 
performance measurement regimes can stimulate a range of strategic 
adaptations commonly referred to as ‘gaming’, which may ultimately 
have a detrimental effect on the actual outcomes achieved… our project 
interviews produced a number of unsolicited comments of such ‘gaming’ 
practices being learnt or observed today in Australia. There are 
indications that in Australian higher education, such ‘gaming’ of 
performance measures has also occurred on the level of whole 
universities and their reporting to government. (Woelert & Yates,  
2015, p. 185).   
The characterisation above of neoliberal theory’s analysis of implementation focuses 
on the dominant economic model, which is centred on the conflicting interests of 
principals and agents and “shirking” of responsibilities by the agents. But there is 
another, less dominant current in neoliberal principal-agent theory – rooted more in 
political science – that focuses instead on “slippage,” caused by conflicting 
understandings. The focus here is on conflicting understandings caused by multiple 
principals demanding different things from the agent or poor communication between 
principal and agent (Kivisto & Zyalevska, 2015, 142; Lane & Kivisto, 2008, pp. 154, 
164-165, 171-172; Miller, 2005, 211-213; Moe, 1984, 768-769).   













implementing performance-based funding.19 Studies of the communication between 
state officials and administrators and faculty of higher education institutions about 
the content and methods of performance funding have documented a high incidence 
of poor communication (Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 52-65, 148, 162-163; Li, 2017b, 
pp. 191-192). For example, in interviews with faculty and administrators in three 
states with leading performance funding systems (Indiana, Ohio, and Tennessee), 
21% of the reports of institutional communication were that there had been no such 
communication at all (Dougherty et al., 2016b, p. 56).  
While neoliberal theory has illuminated the role of gaming in the implementation of 
policy, it has also failed to capture many other factors that are at work in hindering 
organisations in responding to policy initiatives. Let us examine how these missing 
factors show up in analyses of the implementation of performance funding.  
Evidence going beyond the neoliberal conceptualisation of policy 
implementation 
Research on performance-based funding points to several obstacles to 
implementation that neoliberal theory ignores. These include client composition, lack 
of organisational resources, unstable funding, and a poor fit between performance-
funding indicators and organisational missions.  
Client composition. Several studies of US performance funding have pointed to the 
fact that a major impediment to the ability of higher education institutions to meet 
performance demands is the character of their student bodies. Colleges and 
universities will find it difficult to produce as many graduates or job placements as 
demanded if many of the students entering those colleges are not well prepared 
academically or face other social disadvantages (Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 148-
153; Jones et al., 2017, p. 77; McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015; Ness et al., 2015, pp. 
56-58). For example, graduates of predominantly Black institutions in the United 
States face considerable discrimination in hiring that makes it difficult for them to get 
jobs that generate good job placement figures for their colleges (Jones et al., 2017, 
p. 52).20    
Lack of organisational resources. Studies of US performance-based funding find that 
higher education institutions often find it difficult to meet performance demands if 













them and the financial and human resources to mount an effective response 
(Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 146, 156-159; Jenkins, Ellwein, & Boswell, 2009, p. 28; 
Jones et al., 2017, pp. 20, 54, 62, 147-149). Colleges with institutional research 
offices that are poorly financed and not particularly expert find it difficult to isolate the 
causes of poor institutional performance and devise reliable solutions. But even if 
they surmount these hurdles, they often lack the funds to invest in those solutions, 
particularly if they take years to reach fruition.21     
Instability in funding and indicators. Institutional responses to performance funding 
are hindered as well if performance indicators frequently change and institutions 
have difficult predicting how much funding they will receive under the performance 
funding programme. Both sources of volatility make it hard for organisations to plan 
their responses to performance funding and mobilise the necessary resources 
(Dougherty et al., 2016b, p. 148; Li & Zumeta, 2016b, pp. 10-11).   
Poor fit between performance indicators and organisational missions. Higher 
education institutions are also hindered in responding if they find that the PBF 
indicators do not fit well with their organisational missions. As a result, they may 
appear to be performing poorly according to the government’s standards, but not 
according to the institutions’ own lights. This shows up in studies of US performance 
funding (Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 153-156) and studies of performance funding in 
Europe and Australia (Frolich et al., 2010, p. 18; Guthrie & Neumann, 2007, p. 24).22 
This points to the fact that higher education institutions may behave in ways different 
from those intended by policy principals not so much because there is a difference in 
self-interests, as neoliberal theory claims, but a difference in values. This point about 
value conflict is consonant with the bottom-up perspective in implementation studies. 
That perspective notes that the “street level bureaucrats” applying policies may act in 
ways different from those intended by policy designers because they diverge in their 
values and in their understanding of the demands of the local context (see Lipsky, 
1980; Matland, 1995; and Sabatier, 1986).    
 
Impacts of performance-based funding 
Neoliberal discourse on policymaking has focused on the intended impacts of 













Ferlie et al., 2008, p. 335; Harvey, 2005, p. 54; Hood, 1991, p. 3; Kivisto, 2007, pp. 
22-23, 67-98; Pollitt & Dan, 2011, p. 5; Slaughter & Rhoades, 2016, p. 506). There 
has been much less attention to unintended impacts, with many important 
unintended impacts largely ignored by neoliberal theory.   
Intended impacts 
Neoliberal theory has focused on how public organisations can be made more 
effective and efficient (Ferlie et al., 2008, p. 335; Hood, 1991, pp. 11-12, 15; 
Marginson, 1997, p. 5; Olssen & Peters, 20015, pp. 320-322; Pollitt & Dan, 2011, p. 
5).23 When applied to higher education institutions this has taken the form of such 
goals as improved instructional effort, student outcomes (particularly programme 
completion), and faculty research productivity (DeBoer et al., 2015; Dougherty & 
Natow, 2015).  
With regard to instructional effort, studies both in the United States and abroad do 
find evidence of improved instructional effort in response to performance funding. In 
the United States, several studies find that higher education institutions subject to 
performance funding increase their spending on instruction and make improvements 
in their instructional programmes and student services (Banta & Fisher, 1984, pp. 
34–36; Bell, 2005, pp. 107, 121, 129-130; Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 127-129; 
Jenkins et al., 2009, pp. 30-31; Ness, Deupree, & Gándara, 2015, pp. 51-52; and 
Rabovsky, 2012, p. 693; but see Kelchen & Stedrak, 2016, contra). The most 
commonly made campus-level academic changes that occurred around the time of 
performance funding adoption were reshaping developmental education, improving 
course articulation and transfer, and revamping advising and counseling services 
(Dougherty et al., 2016b; Jenkins et al., 2009, pp. 30-31; Ness et al., 2015, p. 51). 
Looking abroad, similar findings appear in the case of performance funding in 
Denmark (Frolich, 2011, pp. 848-849; Jongbloed & Vossensteyn, 2015, p. 590).   
In the case of graduation rates, the effects of performance funding are weaker to 
even nonexistent (Bell, Fryar, & Hillman, 2018; Dougherty et al., 2016b, chap. 6; 
Hillman, Fryar, & Crespin-Trujillo, 2018; Kivisto & Kohtamaki, 2016; Rutherford & 
Rabovsky, 2014; and Umbricht, Fernandez, & Ortagus, 2017). In their meta-analysis 
of 12 US studies, Bell et al. find that the average effect on degree completion is not 
distinguishable from zero (Bell et al., 2018, pp. 116-117). Similarly, in a difference in 













his colleagues find no impact on baccalaureate and associates degree production. 
They do find a significant impact on certificate production, but they argue that this is 
coming at the expense of greater effort to raise baccalaureate and associates 
completion (Hillman et al., 2018, pp. 161-163; see also Hu, forthcoming). Studies of 
performance funding in Europe also fail to find any significant impact of performance 
funding on student completion in the case of Denmark (Claeys-Kulik & Estermann, 
2015, p. 44; Jongbloed & Vossensteyn, 2015, p. 590).   
With regard to the impact of performance funding on research productivity, the 
evidence is positive but not conclusive. Because US performance funding systems 
have largely ignored faculty research outcomes (Dougherty & Natow, 2015, pp. 19-
22), we instead focus on studies of performance funding in other countries. Several 
studies of performance funding in Europe do find evidence that performance funding 
has led to higher rates of faculty research productivity in Denmark, the Netherlands, 
Norway, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and Hong Kong (De Boer et al., 2015, pp. 
60, 91, 114-115; Hare 2003; Huisman & Currie, 2004, pp. 544-545; Jongbloed & 
Vossensteyn, 2015; McNay, 1999, p. 195-199; Mishra, 2016; Morgan, 2004; 
Schenker-Wicki & Hürlimann, 2006; and Sharp, 2004; but see Frolich, 2011 contra). 
However, many of these findings come from studies that do not rely on research 
designs that adequately control for causes other than the advent of performance 
funding.   
The lack of uniformly strong impacts of performance funding on intended 
organisational outcomes may seem surprising. However, this accords with findings 
from studies of the impacts of other kinds of neoliberal policies. For example, in a 
meta-analysis of 49 studies of the impact of performance management, Gerrish 
(2015) found that the mean effect size was only 0.030, statistically significant but 
small. It only rises to 0.12 when one controls for type of performance management 
system, whether it used best practices, and the type of research design.   
Unintended impacts 
While policymakers pursue certain goals when adopting performance funding, there 
are also likely to be – as with any policy intervention – unintended and often 
unanticipated consequences (Dougherty et al., 2016b; Guthrie & Neumann, 2007; Li 
and Zumeta, 2016a).24 Neoliberal theory has anticipated some of the unintended 













but it has paid little attention to several others that have appeared as well in studies 
of the implementation of neoliberal policies, including reduced admission of less 
advantaged students, narrowing of institutional missions, growing stratification of 
institutions and the creation of vicious-cycle mechanisms, growing stratification of the 
academic labour force, and damaged motivation of academic personnel.   
Evidence in keeping with the neoliberal conceptualisation of unintended 
impacts 
Neoliberal theory has devoted attention to how neoliberal policy can impose 
considerable compliance costs, involving additional management and administration, 
on the agents carrying out those policies (Kivisto, 2007, p. 119). And there is good 
reason for this attention. It is a frequent side effect of the application of performance 
funding in the United States (Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 172, 188-190; Gray, 
Harkreader, & Wagar, 2001, pp. 31–32, 36) and in Europe and Australia (DeBoer et 
al., 2015, pp. 17, 115; Guthrie & Neumann, 2007, p. 247).25  
Another unintended impact noted by neoliberal theory is that its proposed reforms 
may result in reductions in the quality of government services as agencies respond 
to heightened competition and declining revenues by cheapening the quality of the 
services they provide (Kivisto, 2007, p. 112).26 This impact has been noted as well 
by studies of the implementation of performance funding both in the United States 
and abroad. Studies of the United States have noted how higher education 
institutions resort to such devices as weakening academic demands through inflating 
grades and reducing the number of difficult courses required for graduation 
(Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 172, 184-188; Dougherty & Hong, 2006, pp. 73–74; 
Jenkins et al., 2009, p. 39). Meanwhile, studies of performance funding abroad have 
noted unintended impacts in both instruction and research. In the case of instruction, 
institutions may reduce their academic demands and churn out graduates (Claeys-
Kulik & Estermann, 2015, pp. 40, 48; Frolich, 2011, pp. 848-850; Frolich et al., 2010, 
pp. 16-17). In the case of research, studies find evidence that performance funding is 
associated with faculty trying to improve their publication statistics by slicing up their 
publications into more articles, many of which are little different from each other, and 
pursuing less difficult research questions (DeBoer et al., 2015, p. 91; Sharp, 2004, 














Evidence going beyond the neoliberal conceptualisation of unintended 
impacts 
Neoliberal theory ignores many important unintended impacts of the policies it 
espouses. The implementation of performance funding has produced such 
unintended impacts as reduced intake of less advantaged students, narrowing of 
institutional missions, growing stratification of institutions and the creation of vicious-
cycle mechanisms, growing stratification of the academic labour force, and damaged 
motivation on the part of higher education personnel.  
Reduced admission of less advantaged students. Many studies of performance 
funding find that performance funding in the United States leads institutions to 
reduce their intake of less advantaged students in order to improve their 
performance (Dougherty et al., 2016b, pp. 172-183; Jones et al., 2017; Kelchen & 
Stedrak, 2016; Li & Zumeta, 2016; McKinney & Hagedorn, 2015; Ness, Dupree, & 
Gandara, 2015. p. 47; Umbricht, Fernandez, & Ortagus, 2017).28 For example, an 
analysis of the impact of PBF on Indiana public institutions finds that – after the 
advent of performance funding – they were admitting more students with high ACT 
college aptitude scores, fewer minority students, and – in some cases – fewer low-
income students (Umbricht et al., 2017, pp. 661-663). American higher education 
institutions can become more restrictive in whom they accept by such means as 
raising their academic requirements, focusing their recruitment activities on 
secondary schools with better prepared and more socially advantaged students, and 
targeting their institutional financial aid on such students (Dougherty et al., 2016b, 
pp. 177-184). Studies of performance funding abroad raise this possibility of reduced 
equity as well. However, they do not cite local evidence to back up that it has indeed 
occurred (DeBoer et al., 2015, p. 15; Santiago et al., 2008, p. 314).  
Governments can counteract such impacts by careful design of performance funding 
programmes. Greater weighting in funding formulas of enrollments and completions 
for underrepresented groups – whether low-income, minority, or older students – can 
provide a counterweight to the temptation of institutions to reduce or keep down their 
intake of such students (Dougherty et al., 2016b, chap. 9; Gandara & Rutherford, 
2017; Kelchen, 2018a). For example, Kelchen conducted a multivariate difference in 
differences study using IPEDS data on 526 public four-year colleges and universities 













examined the impacts of state performance funding systems that included incentives 
to enroll and graduate underrepresented students and of PBF systems that had no 
such incentives. He found that institutions (particularly selective colleges) facing PBF 
systems with egalitarian incentives were more likely to enroll African-American 
students than colleges facing PBF systems with no such incentives. However, he 
found mixed and not statistically significant associations with enrollment of Hispanic, 
low-income, and older students (Kelchen, 2018a, pp. 716-720). In addition, Li, 
Gandara, & Assalone (2018) find that incorporating metrics for student progress can 
protect institutions serving many minority students from being hurt by performance 
funding programmes.   
Distortion of institutional missions and reduction of institutional diversity. By 
financially rewarding some higher education activities more than others, performance 
funding can narrow the range of activities that institutions pursue and reduce the 
diversity of missions among institutions. This has been identified as a problem in 
studies of US performance funding (Bell, 2005, pp. 117-118; Dougherty et al., 2016b, 
pp. 172, 193; Jenkins et al., 2009, pp. 36–37) and of performance funding in Europe, 
Canada, and Australia (Barnetson & Cutright, 2000, p. 286; Claeys-Kulik & 
Estermann, 2015, p. 48; DeBoer et al., 2015, pp. 14, 61-62, 70; Gauthier, 2004, pp. 
104-105; Guthrie & Neumann, 2007, p. 247; Sharp, 2004, p. 202; Sporn, 2018). In 
the case of performance funding for research in England, there is evidence that 
performance funding for research has led researchers to converge in their research 
topics, giving up ones that might prove less useful in securing performance funds, 
and has led institutions to put less emphasis on teaching (McNay, 1999, pp. 195-
200; Sharp, 2004, p. 202).29 
Growing stratification of higher education institutions and the creation of vicious 
cycles. Performance funding studies have identified the danger that it can increase 
inequality of institutional performance by penalising poor performers, leaving them 
without the resources they need to improve their performance. This problem of a 
vicious cycle has been identified in both American and European research (Claeys-
Kulik & Estermann, 2015, pp. 40, 42; Zumeta & Li, 2016, p. 10). Particularly in 
studies of performance funding abroad, researchers have raised the issue that 
performance funding seems to increase stratification between institutions (DeBoer et 













Exercise in England have found that it has led to concentrating more research 
funding in Oxford, Cambridge, and the Russell Group institutions, making it harder 
for other institutions to compete (Morgan, 2004).30 Performance funding can also 
harm minority-serving institutions if the metrics are not carefully designed with their 
situation in mind (Jones et al., 2017).   
Growing stratification of the higher education labour force. Even as performance 
funding can lead to more stratification among institutions, there is also evidence that 
it leads to greater stratification within institutions. Performance funding has been 
found to increase the power of administrators at the expense of faculty in the United 
States and Australia (Dougherty et al. 2016b, pp. 192-193; Dougherty & Reddy, 
2013, pp. 76-77; Guthrie & Neumann, 2007, pp. 234-235).31    
Damaged motivation of institutional personnel. Finally, performance funding has 
been found to erode the motivation of the agents to which it is applied. The 
assumption – particularly in policies driven by principal-agent theory – that the 
agents are not committed to the goals of the institution and often shirk their duties – 
wounds the agents’ amour propre. An emphasis on extrinsic motivation can damage 
the morale of organisational staffers who are substantially oriented by intrinsic 
motives.32 This in turn undercuts their willingness to do the work of the institution 
(Dougherty et al., 2016b, p. 192). For example, a Tennessee faculty member noted: 
“[It is] completely demoralizing…. The implication from this type of funding is that 
we’re not working hard enough, we’re not willing to change, and we’re not willing to 
improve” (quoted in Dougherty et al., 2016b, p. 192). 
 
Conclusions 
In the pages above, we have examined how the development of performance 
funding for higher education can shed light on the strengths and weaknesses of 
neoliberal theory. As we have noted, several different strands of neoliberal theory – 
whether new public management, principal-agent theory, or performance 
management – recommend the use of performance funding.  
Using performance funding as a test case of neoliberal practice, we have examined 













States and abroad. Our aim has been to determine to what degree neoliberal theory 
accurately captures the development and impacts of neoliberal practice.     
With regard to policy origins, we have seen that neoliberal theory correctly 
anticipates the key role that top government officials (both elected and appointed) 
play in the development of performance funding. However, neoliberal theory fails to 
anticipate the important role of business and of higher education institutions in the 
formation of neoliberal policies. The failure to anticipate the important role of higher 
education institutions and their sometimes convergent interests with government 
officials and business largely stems from the fact that neoliberal theory is focused on 
the actions and intentions of policy “principals” and ignores the role of semi-
autonomous “agents” not just in policy implementation but also in policy origins. But 
those agents can play a powerful role in policy origins, pursuing interests of their own 
that both converge and diverge from those of their principals. Finally, neoliberal 
theory fails to point to the important role of socio-political contexts in determining 
which actors and what interests get activated in particular places and times (for 
more, see Schulze-Cleven et al., 2017).   
The “semi-autonomous” role of government officials and agencies, including public 
higher education institutions, can be better understood by drawing on the theory of 
the state and post-pluralist theories of political power (Block, 1987; Carruthers, 1994; 
Dougherty, 1994; Lindblom, 1977; Lindblom & Woodhouse, 1993; Lukes, 2005; 
Roscigno, 2011; Skocpol and Amenta, 1986). The literature on the theory of the 
state illuminates the distinctive interests and values of government officials and how 
they pursue them within a field of force shaped by capitalism on the one hand and 
democracy on the other. The literature on post-pluralist theories of power sheds light 
on how social actors can shape government policy not just through conventional 
forms of political participation such as lobbying and campaign contributions but also 
through controlling the political agenda and by shaping the beliefs and values of 
political decision makers.   
When it comes to policy implementation, neoliberal theory correctly notes the 
important role of monetary incentives as policy instruments and the obstacle posed 
by gaming on the part of agents. Monetary incentives are a key element of 
performance funding and gaming is certainly present. At the same time, the 













instruments such as persuasive communication between principals and agents and 
efforts by principals to build up the organisational capacity of agents. Moreover, the 
performance funding experience also points to a host of obstacles beyond gaming to 
the effectiveness of performance funding. These include unfavorable client 
composition, lack of organisational resources, unstable funding, and a poor fit 
between performance-funding indicators and organisational missions.  
Finally, with regard to outcomes of neoliberal policymaking, the performance funding 
experience raises many questions about the claims of neoliberal theory. The higher 
education outcomes that fit the neoliberal focus on organisational effectiveness and 
efficiency – such as improved instruction, higher rates of graduation, and enhanced 
faculty research productivity – are rather weakly related to performance funding. 
Although performance funding does appear to produce improvements in instructional 
practice and faculty research productivity, there is little evidence that it produces 
increases in graduation rates. And there is the additional problem that performance 
funding is associated with a host of unintended impacts that neoliberal theory largely 
ignores. The theory does point to such problems as compliance costs and drops in 
output quality, but it fails to anticipate such other unintended impacts as reduced 
admission of less advantaged students, narrowing of institutional missions, rising 
inequality among higher education institutions and the creation of vicious-cycle 
mechanisms, growing stratification of the academic labour force, and damaged 
motivation on the part of higher education personnel. These unintended impacts are 
important because they indicate a movement by higher education institutions away 
from egalitarian ideals such as broad access to higher education and higher 
education as a democratising force.   
The analysis of the unintended impacts of performance funding and other neoliberal 
policies would be greatly enriched by drawing on theorising on the unintended 
impacts of purposive action, sparked by the original sociological insights of Robert K. 
Merton (De Zwart, 2015; Franco-Santo & Otley, 2018; Hood & Peters, 2004; Merton, 
1968, 1976; Mica, 2017; Portes, 2000; Sieber, 1981). This literature analyses various 
conditions that increase the likelihood that policy effects deviate from policy 
intentions.   
Table 1 summarises the claims made by neoliberal theory and how well they are 













It also points out features of the origins, implementation, and impacts of performance 
funding that research has discovered but are not anticipated by neoliberal theory.  
 
Table 1: Summary Assessment of the Claims of Neoliberal Theory 
 




Top government officials are key 
proponents of neoliberal policy reform. 
Confirmed 
   Major role of business, exercising both 
direct and indirect power.  
Agents typically resist policies because 
their interests often diverge from those of 
policy principals.  
Substantially disconfirmed. Many higher 
education institutions supported 
performance funding. Their interests and 
values were often convergent with those 




Financial incentives  Confirmed 
Monitoring and accountability processes Confirmed 
 Persuasive communication   
 Capacity building 
  
Obstacles 
Resistance and gaming Confirmed 
 Client composition 
 Lack of organisational resources 
 Unstable funding 
 Poor fit between performance-funding 
indicators and organisational missions.  
  
Policy impacts - Intended 
Improvements in organisational 
performance 
Partially confirmed. More instructional 
spending, instructional reform, and 
research productivity. No big impacts on 
student outcomes.   
  
Policy impacts - Unintended 
Compliance costs Confirmed  













 Reduced admission of disadvantaged 
students 
 Distortion of organisational missions   
 Growing stratification of institutions 
 Growing stratification of higher education 
labour force 




Neoliberal theory has undoubtedly made a contribution to understanding how public 
agencies can be made more responsive. However, as we see above, neoliberal 
theory is also deficient in many regards. Given these major limitations, it is not 
surprising that we have seen major challenges to it in both theory and practice. The 
last two decades have seen the appearance of systematic critiques of neoliberal 
“market fundamentalism” in social theory, social policy, and social practice (Berezin, 
2009; Block & Somers, 2014; Brown, 2011, 2013; Callender & Dougherty, 2018; 
Ganti, 2014; Giroux, 2002; Gledhill, 2004; Greenhouse, 2010; Harvey, 2005; 
Milkman, Luce, & Lewis, 2014; Panitch & Gindin, 2018; Stiglitz, 2018).   
Given the above, performance-based funding is unlikely to make any substantial 
contribution unless it outgrows its neoliberal husk. Whatever promise performance-
based funding might have, it can only be realised if efforts are made to 
systematically address the many unintended impacts it produces and the many 
obstacles it encounters in realising its intended impacts. Neoliberal theory does 
illuminate some of these obstacles and unintended impacts but it misses many 
others. Hence, the design of performance-based funding needs to be shaped in the 
light of perspectives from sociology, political science, anthropology, and social and 
organisation psychology that capture these missing elements (Dougherty et al., 
2016b; Hernandez, 2012; Kiser, 1998; Li & Zumeta, 2016; Moynihan, 2008).   
Important repositories of these other perspectives are studies of policy 
implementation from a bottom-up perspective (Matland, 1995; Sabatier, 1986) and 
from the perspective of how policy implementers make sense of policies, their tasks, 
and their environment (Spillane, Reiser, & Gomez, 2006; Yanow, 1996).   
To begin to address the limitations of performance funding, governments need to 













less prepared and less advantaged students. Governments and institutions can 
monitor academic standards and student learning outcomes through assessments 
and mandatory reporting about grade distributions and degree requirements. 
Anonymous faculty surveys may provide information as to whether instructors feel 
compelled to lower academic standards. Governments may also incentivise the 
enrollment and graduation of disadvantaged students by including metrics for access 
and success of disadvantaged students and by taking account of institutional 
missions and student demographics when assessing relative institutional 
performance (Dougherty et al., 2016a, 2016b; Dougherty & Reddy, 2013; Gandara & 
Rutherford, 2017; Jenkins & Shulock, 2013; Jones et al., 2017; Shulock & Jenkins, 
2011). These steps would help to reduce some of the unintended impacts of 
performance funding. Moreover, governments and institutions should endeavor to 
overcome the barriers to effective responses to performance funding policies, which 
tempt institutions to resort to reducing academic standards and excluding less 
advantaged students. To do this, governments can provide extra funding to higher 
education institutions with many disadvantaged students and take action to help 
institutions improve their capacity to implement changes that respond effectively to 
performance accountability requirements (Dougherty et al., 2016a, 2016b).   
More generally, prescriptions for performance funding need to challenge the “new 
public management” by putting less emphasis on narrowly economistic models of 
organisational behavior and the market- and audit-based controls they favour and 
putting more emphasis on socio-political models of organisational behavior that 
emphasise organisational cooperation and learning (Davis, Schoorman, & 
Donaldson, 1997; Ferlie et al., 2008, 2011; Hernandez, 2012; Moynihan, 2008). For 
example, this second approach emphasises the importance of organisational 
learning involving the systematic gathering and consideration of information on 
organisational performance through decentralised, egalitarian, and well-funded 
learning forums that bring together a wide range of people inside and outside 
organisations (Bensimon, Dowd, Longanecker, & Witham, 2012; Dougherty et al., 
2016b; Moynihan, 2008).33   
In order to do this effectively, performance-based funding needs to be firmly 
grounded in an awareness of how organisational performance is shaped by a host of 













organisational culture and leadership; organisational resources and capacity; the 
external environment, including other organisations, the economy, and government; 
and the interests and power of differentially advantaged social groups (Burke, 2011; 
Dougherty et al., 2016b; Kezar, 2014; Jones et al., 2017; Moynihan, 2008, pp. 202-
205; Rabovsky, 2014b). This socio-political perspective converges with a 
conceptualisation of nonprofit agencies as involving multiple stakeholders who have 
made investments – emotional as often as economic – in those organisations. 
Consequently, the interests that need to be considered are not just those of the 
agency “owners” or “principals,” whether government officials or agency directors, 
but also those of the “employees” or “agents” and other stakeholders (see 
Speckbacher, 2003).    
Finally, any successor to neoliberal policy and theory needs to pay close attention to 
stratification by class, race, gender, and other social characteristics. If these are not 
kept foremost in mind, there is a danger that any policy that pursues efficiency will do 
considerable damage. Apostles of efficiency always need to consider “efficiency for 
whom?” Are gains in efficiency – even if the majority of the population benefits – 
being purchased at the cost of harming those disadvantaged by systems of class, 
racial, gender, and other inequality (see Fisman, Jakiela, Kariv, & Markovits, 2015; 
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and sociological versions of principal-agent theory (Kiser, 1999; Lane & Kivisto, 2008; Miller, 2005). 
2 For example, NPM has been defined as “a reform model arguing that the quality and efficiency of 
the civil service should be improved by introducing management techniques and practices drawn 
mainly from the private sector” (Bleiklie, 2018, p. 1).  
3 See Marginson (2009) for an analysis of why higher education can never fully become a market.  
4 The US federal government also has its own performance funding programs. For example, the 
federal government funds students to attend vocational programs in higher education so long as 
those programs maintain a certain minimum graduation rate and their students do not emerge overly 
indebted  (Kelchen, 2018b; Natow, 2017).  Moreover, it could be argued that the massive system of 
federal funding for research – through such agencies as the National Science Foundation and the 
National Institutes of Health -- constitutes a form of performance-based funding in that funding is 
based on competitive proposals and a researcher’s track record is a major factor in securing approval 
of a proposal.   
5 We are including here performance agreements in which governments advance funding to 
institutions in return for promised performance outcomes (Jongbloed, Kaiser, van Vught, & 













                                                                                                                                                  
6 This quotation and others that cite Dougherty & Natow (2015) appear in The Politics of Performance 
Funding. © 2015 Johns Hopkins University Press.  
7 See Barzelay (2001) for evidence of the key role of top government officials (both elected and 
appointed) in other neoliberal reforms in the United States, Canada, England, Australia, and New 
Zealand.  
8 For more on indirect, nonparticipative political power exercised by business, see the exposition of 
nonpluralist theories of power in Dougherty (1994), Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993), and Lukes 
(2005).  
9 Though neoliberal theory has many parents, business patronage is one of the more important ones.  
For more, see Harvey (2005, chap. 2), Jones (2012b), and Steger & Roy (2010, p. 23).  
10 This power of economic “constraint” resembles the second dimension of power discussed by Lukes 
(2005).  For more, see Dougherty (1994) and Lindblom & Woodhouse (1993).  
11 Studies of the enactment of neoliberal reforms in other areas of public policy also find evidence of 
support from the agents and value convergence with the principals (Fitzgerald & Ferlie, 2000, pp. 729, 
734; Nyhagen, Bleiklie, & Hope, 2017, p. 291).    
12 This motive fits with the criticism that principal-agent theory relies on too narrow a conceptualization 
of self-interest (Perrow, 1990; Renmans et al., 2016).   
13 In a meta-analysis of reforms conducted under the banner of the new public management, Pollitt & 
Dan (2011, pp. 56, 59) find evidence that those reforms allow government agencies a way to 
demonstrate an anti-bureaucratic stance, evidence of active and reforming government, and a 
customer orientation. 
14 Only three southern states (Arkansas, Florida, and Virginia) had provisions for race metrics and all 
three made them optional (Jones et al., 2016, pp. 131-132).  Another study finds that only two 
Southern states (Tennessee and Virginia) have performance-based funding programs that provide an 
incentive for advancing and graduating minority students (Gandara & Rutherford, 2018).   
15 For general treatments of the concept of policy instruments, see McDonnell & Elmore (1987), 
Schneider & Ingram, (1990), Van Vught (1994), and Nyhagen, Bleiklie, & Hope (2017).  
16 For other analyses of capacity building as a policy instrument in the implementation of neoliberal 
policies, see Pollitt & Dan (2011), pp. 40, 43, 55.  
17 Gaming responses have been found as well in studies of neoliberal policymaking other than 
performance funding for higher education (DeBruijn, 2002, pp. 21-32; Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & 
Pettigrew, 1996, pp. 112-115; Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018, p. 718; Grizzle, 2002, pp. 363-65; 
Heinrich & Marschke, 2010, pp. 195-196; Moynihan, 2010, pp. 288-289; Radin, 2006, pp. 17-19; 
Renmans, Paul, & Dujardin, 2016, p. 11; Van Thiel & Leeuw, 2002, p. 27).  For a more general 
treatment of gaming in the policy implementation process, see Bardach (1977).   
18 This and other quotations that cite Dougherty et al. (2016b) appear in Performance Funding for 
Higher Education. © 2016 Johns Hopkins University Press. 
19 Evidence of poor communication between principals and agents also shows up in analyses of other 
forms of neoliberal policymaking (Colyvas, 2012, p. 178; Romzek, 2000, p. 30; Townley, Cooper, & 
Oakes, 2003, pp. 1061-1062).   
20 Studies of the implementation of other neoliberal policies also find that client composition can 
hinder public agencies in meeting performance targets (Andrews et al., 2006, p. 286; Meier & Bohte, 
2003; Moynihan, 2008, p. 202; Pollitt & Dan, 2011, pp. 40-41, 55).  
21 Further evidence for the importance of organizational resources can be found in the studies of the 
implementation of other types of neoliberal policies by Andrews et al. (2006), pp. 286-287; Moynihan 
(2008), pp. 104-105, 113, 167, 178-185; Pollitt & Dan (2011), pp. 40, 43. 55; Rabovsky (2014b), p. 
267; and Schick (2003), pp. 84-86. Also see Kerrigan (2014, 2015); and Light (2014).  For discussions 
in the policy implementation literature on the importance of organizational resources, see Honig 
(2006), pp. 5-6; Matland (1995), p. 161; Sabatier (1986), p. 23; and Sunderman & Kim (2007), pp. 
1072, 1077.  
22 The perception of a gap between indicators and the real nature of the institutional processes they 
are measuring is an example of the political and organizational conflict over commensuration 













                                                                                                                                                  
23 This focus on efficiency should not obscure the fact that a major part of the appeal of neoliberal 
theory is its largely unstated but nonetheless real emphasis that governments have a moral duty to 
introduce market mechanisms wherever possible.  Government should not be allowed to be insulated 
from the culture of capitalism.   
24 For theoretically based conceptualizations of unintended impacts of purposive social action, see De 
Zwart (2015), Elias (1978, 1987), Merton (1968, 1976), Mica (2017), Portes (2000), and Sieber 
(1981).  It should be noted that unintended and unanticipated actions are not one and the same; a 
result can be anticipated but unintended.    
25 Compliance costs are also noted in studies of other neoliberal reforms (Brown, 2013, p. 125; 
Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018, p. 718; Renmans et al., 2016, pp. 15-16; Stensaker, 2003, p. 155).   
26 At the same time, we should note that a major motive for policy makers’ efforts to increase the 
competitive situation of higher education institutions is to force them to improve their quality (Sporn, 
2018). 
27 Studies of other kinds of neoliberal reforms also find evidence of quality reductions (Brown, 2013, 
pp. 149-150).  
28 Equity reductions or what has also been called “creaming” or “cherry picking” turn up frequently in 
studies of performance management and other forms of neoliberal policymaking (Grizzle, 2002; 
Heckman, Heinrich, Courty, Marschke, & Smith, 2011; Heinrich & Marschke, 2010; Lake, Kvam, & 
Gold, 2005; Moynihan, 2008, 2010; Rothstein, 2008a, 2008b; Stecher & Kirby, 2004; Van Theil & 
Leeuw, 2002; Wells & Johnson, 2001).     
29 Studies of other neoliberal reforms have also documented that they can lead to distortion and 
narrowing of missions (Bevan & Hood, 2006, pp. 521, 524, 530-531; Brown, 2013, p. 124; Colyvas, 
2012, p. 183; Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018, p. 718; Marginson, 1997, pp. 12-13; Moynihan, 2010, p. 
289; Rothstein, 2008b, pp. 9-23; Speckbacher, 2003, p. 273; Van Theil & Leeuw, 2002, pp. 273-274).   
30 Vicious-cycle effects have been identified as well in analyses of other neoliberal reforms (Renmans 
et al., 2016, p. 16).  
31 Similar impacts have been found in studies of the implementation of other neoliberal reforms 
(Ferlie, Ashburner, Fitzgerald, & Pettigrew, 1996, pp. 65, 112, 167, 176).  
32 Studies of other forms of neoliberal reform have pointed out the same negative impact on staff 
morale (Ferlie & Franco-Santos & Otley, 2018, pp. 718, 720; Geraghty, 2005, p. 423; Power, 1997, p. 
2; Shore & Wright, 2000, p. 77; and Speckbacher, 2003, p. 273).  
33 This emphasis fits well with the conceptualization -- advanced by the Advocacy Coalition 
Framework in policy studies -- of the conditions of effective policy learning across advocacy coalitions 
(Jenkins-Smith, Nohrstedt, Weible, & Ingold, 2018). 
